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ABSTRACT 
One reform strategy to improve judicial performance has been to establish special 
courts. While hailed by some'as an effective tool, others have pointed at the dangers 
to 'sidestep' the general judiciary in this manner. Indonesia provides an interesting 
case to examin'e these claims as in probably no other country have those seeking 
to reform the judiciary invested so much in special courts. The present paper 
evaluates the performance of some of Indonesia's special courts. Its main focus is 
the administrative courts, as the oldest and most 'trialled' of the list. It identifies to 
what extent the special court nature has been relevant to their peiformance and on 
this basis formulates four theses. These are then tested from the experiences with 
two other special courts: the tax courts and the commercial courts. In the conclusion 
these finding;; are summarily related to data of the other special courts. The analysis 
will demonstrate that it depends on the conditions under which special courts evolve 
whether they can actually contribute in a positive manner to judicial peJjormance. 
On the one hand serious problems with access and jurisdiction are associated with 
some of them, but on the other these courts perform relatively well on political 
independence and expertise. Carejitlly considered and introduced, specialisation of 
courts may be beneficial indeed. 
Key words: special court, judicial perfonnance, jurisdiction. 
INTRODUCTION Western European-Japanese phenomenon, 
but have since found their way into the state 
structures of countries as diverse as South 
Africa, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Thailand 
and Indonesia.! Parallel to the establishment 
of constitutional courts many countries have 
adopted administrative courts, commercial 
courts, land courts, fisheries courts, tax 
courts, etc. Malaysia even established a 
In many countries, in particular in 
Asia, reformers have embarked upon a 
course of establishing new specialised 
courts in _an attempt to reinforce the role 
of their judiciaries and improve their 
performance. The most conspicuous 
example are constitutional courts, which 
twenty years ago were still a typically 
• Senior Lecturer, Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law Governance and Development, Faculty of Law, 
Universitcit Leiden. 
1 For an (incomplete) list see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCollstittlfional_Court>. 
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special court for criminal suits against its 
Sultans, which has heard one case since it 
opened its gates. 2 
The amount of scholarly work 
comparing these court policies stands in 
remarkable contrast to their popularity. 
Although much has been written about 
individual cases, little attention seems 
to have been paid to this approach in 
a more comparative manner-with the 
already mentioned constitutional courts 
as an exception.3 This paper intends to 
offer a modest incentive for taking up 
such research. It will start with a so-called 
'internal comparison', looking at special 
c.ourt establishment and performance in a 
single country. On that basis it will formulate 
a few assumptions which may then serve as 
the point of departure for comparative work 
across countries. 
The paper's focus will be on Indonesia, 
where the special court policy has been 
particularly prominent. It takes the 
administrative courts as the 'baseline' for the 
comparison proposed. Administrative courts 
were the first in a long line of specialised 
courts to be established in Indonesia in 
order to revamp a court system generally 
held to be dysfunctional. Although this 
development only gained speed with the 
demise of the New Order in 1998, the 
reasons to establish the administrative 
courts in 1986 were in many ways similar 
to those 1lilderlying the establishment of the 
tax courts (1994), the commercial courts 
(1998), the human rights courts (2000), 
the constitutional court (2004), the anti-
corruption court (2005), the labour courts 
(2006), and tile fisheries courts (2007). In all 
of these cases new courts were thought of as 
an effective way to improve a special section 
of the administration ofjustice.4 It moreover 
seems that this development has not ended 
yet, given current policy discussions about 
establishing special courts for land affairs 
and environmental matters. 
The popularity of this diversification 
suggests that the specialised courts 
established so far must have been quite 
successful. Why would the Indonesian 
legislator put so much effort in creating new 
types of court if the experience available 
would indicate that they fail to achieve their 
objectives?Neither should one overlook the 
wide support for new courts in civil society 
circles critical of the government. The idea 
of environmental courts, for instance, comes 
from environmental NOOs,s justas the ideas 
for the new labour courts are not mainly 
from the politically influential employers' 
associations, but rather from the trade 
unions.6 Although the political motivation 
behind each court differs and although 
in each case different political interests 
coalesce, there no~etheless seems to be a 
commonly held belief in the effectiveness 
of specialised courts as such. 
In order to judge whether the special 
courts' record actually gives reasons to 
support this conviction, it makes sense to 
look at various aspects of their perfonnance. 
Central are what might be called efficienqy 
and effectiveness. 
2 Lee, RP. (2007) Malaysian Royalty and the Special Court, paper presented at the conference 'New Courts 
in Asia', 13 July, University of Victoria. 
3 E.g. Ginsburg, T. (2003) Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, New 
York, Cambridge University Press. Commercial courts have also received comparative attention, e.g. Tomasic, 
R. (ed.) (2006) Insolvency Law in East Asia, London, Ashgate . 
4 One could add the refonn of the Islamic courts ill 1989 to this list. 
5 Among them prominently the Indonesian Centre of En vi rOll mental Law, see e.g. Kompas 16-12-2003. 
6 Person[l\ communication from labour law activist and lecturer Surya Tjandra (16-10-2007). 
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By efficiency I mean a proper balance 
between costs in tenns of efforts, time and 
money on the part of the litigants and a 
well-informed judgment which provides 
a potentially effective remedy. It is the 
perception of efficiency that to a large extent 
determines whether citizens will make use 
of a court. Effectiveness, the way I use it, is 
closely related to the notion of efficiency, 
but it looks beyond the final judgment of 
the court, referring to the situation that a 
dispute is effectively resolved. This does 
not necessarily mean that the judgment 
is implemented, but is also the case if 
the parties negotiate an agreement 'in the 
shadow of the judgrnene. 
Important factors determining 
efficiency and effectiveness are judicial 
independence (political and social), expertise 
(professionalism), and accessibility. Judicial 
independence, the main underpinning of 
judicial impartiality can be divided into 
political and social independence. While 
under Soeharto's New Order regime most 
attention went to the political influence of 
the regime on the administration of justice, 
the advent of a democracy has to a large 
extent shifted worries to the issue of social 
independence. This concerns the question 
to what extent judges decide cases without 
being subject to (improper) influence by 
the parties to a dispute or those siding with 
them. The two may be closely connected, 
but in many cases they are not and therefore 
require separate discussion. 
Expertise refers to the professional 
knowledge of judges in interpreting the 
law. It is related to independence, as lack 
of expertise tends to reinforce the influence 
of factors external to the law and external 
to the facts of the case. The quality and 
relative importance of expertise not only 
depend On legal education and training, but 
also on more structural issues as quality of 
legislation and jurisprudence. 
The third factor underlying efficiency 
and effectiveness is accessibility, which 
has both a legal and a practical side. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to look at the 
relation of court litigation with other forms 
of dispute resolution, even if this admittedly 
is a major determinant of whether courts 
are used or not. In this paper I will mainly 
limit myself to look at the jurisdiction of 
the state courts concerned and their physical 
accessibility. 
The paper proceeds as follows. It 
starts with a relatively detailed analysis of 
the administrative courts, which to some 
extent served as a pilot project for the 
others. On this basis I will formulate four 
theses regarding the results of the special 
court strategy, which I will test on the 
basis of brief analyses of the subsequently 
established tax courts and commercial 
courts. In the conclusion I will relate these 
findings summarily to data on the other 
special courts in Indonesia and present some 
tentative notes regarding the potential of 
specialised courts as a means of improving 
the performance of the judiciary. 
The Administrative Courts 
Indonesia's administrative courts 
opened their gates in 1991 on the basis of 
the Administrative Court Act no. 5 of 1986. 
To many they came as a surprise, for the 
Soeharto regime was neither known as very 
supportive of critique on its performance 
nor as particularly concerned about the 
quality of judicial performance. It would 
therefore be incorrect to view them as a 
straightforward answer to the problems of 
the civil courts in dealing with cases against 
the government. Instead, their genesis can 
be explained by a complex of reasons, some 
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of which relate to the wish for improving 
judicial performance more in general, but 
others certainly not.? 
Nonetheless, the reason cited most 
often during the period preceding the 
enactment of the Administrative Court 
Act was that the civil courts would be 
ineffective in redressing unlawful acts by 
the government. The jurisdiction of the civil 
courts in administrative matters was indeed 
limited and the opinion prevailed that they 
had failed to exercise the powers assigned 
to them to the full. 8 Administrative courts 
with specialised judges were thought to be 
the most logical answer to overcome this 
problem. This idea had its roots in civil law 
history where since long administrative 
courts have been promoted as the most 
proper institution to deal with claims against 
the government and which travelled to 
Indonesia with colonial jurists? 
A more formal reason was the legal 
blueprint for the organisation ofthe judiciary 
in Indonesia, laid down in Act no. 14 of 
1970. By enacting this law tlle government 
had refused almost all of the demands of the 
coalition of advocates and judges fighting 
for the rule of law during the first years 
of the New Order. 10 Neither constitutional 
review nor court administration by the 
Supreme Court, the two main items on the 
wish list of the rule oflaw supporters, were 
part of Act no. 14. However, as a sort of 
eyewash it introduced a specialised branch 
of administrative courts into the judicial 
structure. 
It took another 16 years before the 
Administrative Court Act Was finally 
promulgated. While some Ministers' of 
Justice serving under Soeharto supported the 
introduction of administrative courts for the 
same reasons as the rule of law supporters, 
this was not the case with Minister Ismail 
Saleh who would finally introduce them. 
Saleh was convinced that administrative 
courts would not constitute a serious threat 
for the executive's dominance under the New 
Order, but that they wouid be an effective 
means to boost its legitimacy.ll 
There is little doubt that this was 
the main political reason to establish the 
administrative courts, and the only one 
acceptable to Soeharto himself.12 Both 
domestically and internationally visible 
judicial control of the executive would 
reinforce the image of the New Order as a 
basically benevolent regime, allowing for 
ordered and lawful redress of some of its 
less appropriate actions. 
This obviously had consequences for 
the form of the institution to be established. 
First, the jurisdiction of the courts and their 
powers of review had to be limited. Control 
that could effectively hamper projects held 
7 I have dcscribed this process in det.:til elscwherc, see Bedner, A.W. (2001) Adlllinlstrativr? Courts in Indonesia: 
A Soda-Legal Study, The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, in particular pp. 49-51. 
g A survey of reported general court cases on govemment tort shows that the general court record was in fact 
not as bad as often assumed (Bedner (2001) Chapter 1) 
9 Be~ner (2001), pp. 11-15. The irony of the situation was that The Netherlands constituted the single exception 
among clVillaw countries in Europe whieh by tl1.:tt time had not established administrative courts or tribunals. 
10 Lev, D. (1978) 'Judicial Authority and the Struggle fur an Tndoncsilm Rechtssta.:tt', Law & Society Review, 
13, pp. 37-7l. 
11 Here is may be useful to recall that Sa[eh himself was responsible for censoring the press, without any 
clear legal basis. 
12 Bed.n~f (2001), pp. 29-30, Bourchier (1999) 'Magic Memos, Collusion and Judges with Attitudes: Notes 
on the Poht~es of Law in Contemrorary Indoncsins', in Jaynsuriya, K. (ed.) La.,.,; Capitalism and Power in Asia: 
The RIIle oj Law and Legal Il1stittftions, London and New York, Routkdge, pp. 233-252. 
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dear by the New Order was out of the 
question, as had been made clear in those 
cases where general courts had attempted 
something ofthe sort. Never again a Kedung 
Ombo, the court case against the government 
on account of insufficient compensation for 
land clearance that turned into a publicity 
nightmare for the government. 
Second, the courts needed to be visible. 
Although separate courts were expensive and 
entailed a host of organisational problems 
such as staffing, housing, etc., they would be 
more effective in obtaining the legitimising 
effect Ismail Saleh aimed for. 13 
In addition, the establishment of 
specialised administrative courts made 
it possible for the government to control 
their number. Viewed from a citizens' 
perspective, the new courts were in fact a 
substantial step backwards in protection 
for most of them. Since the civil courts 
lost their jurisdiction over cases involving 
administrative decisions - or at least over 
that part of the case brought before them 
concerned with such decisions - plaintiffs 
now had to bring cases to administrative 
courts of first instance that in theory could 
be thousands of miles away from their 
domicile, as initially only five of them were 
established. 
Others involved in establishing the 
administrative courts - notably academics 
- would have liked a broader jurisdiction, 
but supported separate courts because this 
would create an independent pool of judges, 
better educated than those in the general 
courts and less susceptible to corruption and 
political pressure.14 
The same logics underlied the decision, 
unsupported by most career judges, to 
allow for so~called 'judges in ad hoc'. These 
were outsiders who could be appointed to 
serve incidentally as judges on the new 
administrative courts. In this manner the 
court system would be opened to fresh 
perspectives in its councils of judges. 
A decisive factor in shaping the new 
courts, finally, was the programme of legal 
co~operation with The Netherlands, and the 
fact that this country presented a system so 
limited in jurisdiction that it was acceptable 
to the New Order regime. The co·operation 
programme was instrumental in drafting 
the Administrative Court Act, modelling it 
on the Dutch AROB-procedure, which only 
allowed for reviewing individual, concrete 
and final government decisions. It still took 
a lot of persuasion by reformers to allow 
for proper principles of administration 
as a ground for review, which in the end 
were more or less smuggled in through the 
backdoor. 15 
It is important to acknOWledge that 
various sides held different reasons to 
support the establishment of specialised 
administrative courts. Establishing special 
courts usually is a highly politicised issue 
and can hardly ever be considered as a 
straightforward move towards improving 
comt performance. In the case of the 
administrative courts, those who had been 
driving the process for most of the time 
were the ones who thought that insulation 
from the general courts in combination 
with strict selection policies, special 
education and ad~hoc judges would create 
13 Just as the National Human Rights Commission, established a few years later, 
14 Interviews with the major drafter of the ACA Indrohurto (December 1994), co-drafter Paulus Lotulung 
(August 1994) and prof. P. Hadjon (November 1996. 
15 The minutes of the parliamentary debates on the ACA show that these were not included explicitly for 
political rea~"Ons - as this would have antagonised certain powerful segments of the political establishment - but 
that the govcmmcnt did not altogether disapprove of their application (Bedner (1991), p. 42). 
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an elite kind of court which would be 
sufficiently independent to stand up against 
the government. They consisted of idealistic 
advocates, independent~mindedjudges'and 
officials within the Ministry of Justice, later 
joined by the Dutch donors.16 The more 
cynical side was represented by Minister of 
Justice Ismail Saleh. Although he may have 
believed that the administrative courts in the 
long run would assist in disciplining officials 
at lower levels of the administration, his 
fundamental objective was political: the 
administrative courts would buy the New 
Order regime legitimacy, both nationally and 
internationally, as a token of the Indonesian 
commitment to establish the rule of law. 
The result ofthis process was a mixed 
bag of limitations and opportunities. There 
were high expectations of the courts, 
but they also enjoyed much goodwill. 
Newspaper comments showed awareness 
of the pOlitical constraints they had to face 
and emphasised the intrepidness required 
for serving on them. I? Unsurprisingly, the 
perfonnance of the courts turned out to be 
mixed as well. 
Administrative Court Practice 
As indicated above, the jurisdiction 
assigned to the administrative courts was 
quite limited. They were only allowed 
to review administrative decisions of an 
individual, concrete and final nature, which 
left out all 'real' acts and their consequences, 
as well as all regulations ofa general nature. 
This is not to say that these latter two were 
not subject to any form of judicial review, 
as both could still be submitted to the civil 
(general) courts in the framework of an 
action based on govennnent tort. 18 Officially 
the reason not to give this jurisdiction to the 
administrative courts was that they lacked 
the expertise required to deal with damages, 
which would be often involved in such suits, 
but this is not very convincing as the same 
applies to individual decisions. More likely, 
it was the uncertainty of the government as 
to what they could expect that motivated 
this choice and seriously restricted the new 
courts"potential caseload. 
Indeed, after they opened their gates, 
it soon be.came clear that the administrative 
courts were not going to be flooded by 
cases. Rather on the contrary, from the start 
the case numbers have been low, even in 
large cities as Jakarta and Surabaya. This 
has provoked a predictable reaction from 
the courts: from the start they have tried to 
broaden their jurisdiction, be it unfortunately 
in a rather erratic and tentative manner and 
unsupported by the Supreme Court which 
in almost all cases has struck down these 
attempts. 
As an example we may consider the first 
target of judicial expansion: the definition of 
administrative decisions, meaning decisions 
taken by an administrative official (Art. 
1(3) of the AeA). Literally any decision 
maker who could be possibly considered 
an administrative official has been brought 
under this definition one or several times. 
Thus, the courts have allowed claims against 
16 On this issue see also Olto (1992) 'Conflicts between Citizens and the State in Indonesia: The Development 
of Administrative Jurisdiction', Leiden, Van Vollenhoven Institute, Working Paper no. 1. 
17 This appears from a survey of newspaper comments in 1991, when the courts became operative. 
18 In 1993 the Supreme Court introduced a novelty in the fonn of a special action against gel1eral regulations, 
with the exception of acts ofparliarnent. This action straightly addresses the Supreme Court (pompe, S. (2005) 
The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study o/Instilutional Collapse, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 
p. 146. Until that date civil courts could not invalidate general regulations, but they could in the framework ora 
government tor! case declare unbinding a particular provision of a gcneralnuture in a regulation below the level 
of acts of parliament. 
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decisions by state-owned limited liability 
companies, private universities, local 
government co-ordination boards without 
any decision-making powers, secret service 
agencies, notaries, and political parties,19 
Similar stories can be told about the other 
elements of the definition of administrative 
decisions, while administrative courts have 
incidentally also accepted claims against 
administrative decisions of a general 
nature,20 
The courts have also tried to circmnvent 
the 90 days' tenn of limitation, The most 
outstanding example is Dahniar and others 
v, Head o/the National.LandAgency. In this 
case the judges were asked to implement a 
1967 sales contract concerning a plot ofland 
in Central Jakarta, This involved a whole 
series of decisions, thtl first one being a 
1972 certificate of ownership and only the 
last one - a land use permit - falling inside 
the 90 days' term, The court decided that if 
the government issued a decision that bore 
a connection to earlier decisions, the entire 
'chain' of decisions would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the court. Just as in the other 
cases, this judgment was later overturned by 
the Supreme Court.21 
As hinted at in the introduction, 
administrative court jurisdiction has also 
been progressively limited in the field of 
litigation concerning decisions taken on 
administrative appeal, which are subject to 
administrative court review on the basis of 
Art. 48. Such appeals constituted the bulk 
of cases in the Administrative High ,Court in 
Jakarta, where both the Tax Tribunal (Majelis 
Pertimbangan Pajak) and the Central 
Tribunal for Labour Disputes (Panitia 
Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan 
Pusat) resided. However, both tax and 
labour disputes have now been brought 
under the powers of more specialised 
courts, the former in 1994 and the latter in 
2007,22 In the first case this led to critique 
by administrative court supporters that such 
a change violated the formally prescribed 
structure ofIndonesia's court system,23 but 
in the second they even referred explicitly to 
the consequences of the drop in caseload this 
would mean for the Jakarta Administrative 
High Court. 24 
The only field where the Supreme 
Court has allowed the administrative 
courts to assume jurisdiction over cases 
that in most jurisdictions would not qualify 
as administrative decisions are those 
concerning land law. The objects in such 
cases are usually land certificates and 
related decisions, which are only corollary 
to civil law relations. Consequently, the I 
administrative courts in fact have little 
to decide. However, instead of referring 
cases back to the civil courts for the 
civil law questions, they tend to answer 
these questions themselves - and here the 
Supreme Court has done little to redress 
such fiaws?5 
19 Bedner (200 1), pp. 54-60. 
20 E.g. Wy'aya v. Mayor of Medan, no. 16/Gi1991IPTUN-Mdn. (Direktorat , Himpunall Pulusan-PutusalJ 
Pcngadi/an Toto Usaha Ncgara dan Pel/gadi/an Tinggi Tata .Usaha.Negara). . .. 
21 The administrative courts of appeal have not always Sided with the courts of first mstnnce In these cases, 
but they hnve mostly left their judgments in place (see Bedner, (2001) pp. 53-92). 
22 On the basis of Act no. 9 ofl994 (later replaced by Law no. 14 of 2002) and by Act no. 2 of2004. 
23 E.g. Lotulung, P. (1996) Development of the Administrative Jurisdiction on Tax Cases in Indonesia', 
'nd()!1(.'sion Law and Administration Reliiew, no. 1, pp. 28-31. 
24 Hllkull'l0l11im! 24-1-2005. According to the registrar oftlle Jakarta Administrative High Court about 80";;' 
of the court's cnse10ad concerned labour disputes. 
25 Bedner (200 1) pp. 169-170. 
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Thus, at present the administrative 
courts receive few cases and the relative 
numberofland law cases has risen, According 
to the estimation of an administrative court 
judge, today about 95% of all the cases in 
the administrative courts concern land26 and 
most of them should in fact be heard by the 
civil courts, While administrative courts in. 
the cities of Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, 
Surabaya, Makassar and Medan still receive 
sufficient cases to keep their judges busy 
(80 to 100 a year), this is certainly not true 
for those in more outlying areas such as 
Denpasar, Mataram, Kupang etc. These 
courts have from the start confronted a 
serious lack of cases which has continued 
until the present.27 The average number of 
cases per administrative judge in that same 
year was six.28 As one judge remarked, TI 
like to go fishing ( .. ,]. But if you don't have 
any hobbies, like fishing, tennis, sports, etc., 
well, you get stressed, You just wait in your 
office every day.'29 
One can therefore imagine that the 
administrative courts are tempted to 
continue their search for new cases and 
to ignore the Supreme Court. Thus, more 
recently administrative courts have also 
assumed jurisdiction over administrative 
decisions clearly outside their powers such 
as Environmental Impact Assessments,30 a 
decision to repeat a tendering procedure,31 a 
decision to build a road,32 a decision to use 
money from the district budget for new cars 
26 Interview with Irfan Fachruddin, June2007. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Supreme Court report 2007. 
29 Interview, July 1999. 
30 Tempo fnteraktif14-2-2004. 
3J Kompas 1-8-2000 and 4-8-2000. 
32 Kompas 6.3-2000. 
3] Kompas 13-10-2000. 
34 Kompas 16-5-2002. 
for members of the District Parliament,33 or 
a decree to raise parking tariffs.34 
The positive side of this coin is the 
degree of judicial political, independence it 
has stimulated. The administrative courts 
have obviously not been afraid to extend 
their jurisdiction to the detriment of the 
executive, This even applied during the 
authoritarian days of the New Order, when 
certain judges went as far as hearing cases 
against the feared secret service, The number 
of judgments deviating from Supreme Court 
case law moreover demonstrates that a high 
degree of judicial independence has also 
been present at the level of the individual 
court.35 First instance courts in particular 
apparently do not fear the consequences 
of stepping out of line from the Supreme 
Court. However, as I will argue later in this 
article, this does not mean that Indonesian 
judges are well insulated from external, 
'social' influences. 
A similar expansion as noted regarding 
jurisdiction can be perceived when looking 
at the review powers of the administrative 
courts. They can officially declare unlawful 
administrative acts for contravention of 
laws and regulations, misuse of power, or 
arbitrariness. As indicated earlier, general 
principles of proper administration were not 
explicitly listed in the ACA, but the courts 
have from the start applied this important 
ground for review, orienting themselves on 
the list of principles advocated by Indrohmio 
35 One might assume that this independence extends to the level of councils of judges or even individual 
judges. This is not the case, however. 
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in his influential book on administrative 
litigation.36 
An initial problem with their application 
has been a lack of un if ormity in interpretation. 
The Supreme Court has failed to give much 
guidance in this matter, as it has published 
only two judgments in which it applied 
principles of proper administration, nor has 
it provided any guide lines in the fonn of 
circular lettersY Remarkably, though, 
and in spite of the somewhat problematic 
communication between higher and lower 
courts, the problem has become less apparent 
in later years. 38 This shows the other side of 
the coin of a limited number of cases, being 
that (legal) infonnation gets. around more 
easily, by means of courses and perhaps 
by the cassation judgments that get back to 
judges of the lower courts. In other words, 
specialisation in this case leads to a higher 
degree of unifonnity in the administration 
of justice, even if for various reasons judges 
may be tempted to follow their own course. 
In that case at least they know that they 
are digressing from more widely shared or 
authorative interpretations. 
That extension of its powers has 
somehow become the hallmark of the 
administrative courts is thrown into even 
starker relief if we look at their remedial 
powers. The first of these concerns 
suspension of the litigated act. It finds its 
basis in the fact that a litigated decision 
in principle maintains its validity. This 
is obviously a serious problem in those 
cases where the said decision licenses the 
government to perform actions that cannot 
be undone, or only at great cost or difficulty. 
A good example is demolition or eviction 
orders, which indeed have been frequently 
addressed in court for this purpose.39 
However, it has not only been these 
kinds of orders which have been suspended. 
During the first years the administrative 
courts developed a suspension practice 
that almost equalled its jurisdictionary 
expansion. Although it has controlled the 
most exuberant uses made of the provision, 
it is virtually impossible for the Supreme 
Court to control the reasoning underlying 
suspension orders. In many cases judges 
have simply granted suspension without 
giving any reasons at all (which goes 
straight against the law), or with providing 
statements such as 'the case is not entirely 
clear yet'40 or' because it has not been clearly 
proved during the preparatory investigation 
where the faults of both parties lie'.41 
The main explanation for judges from 
the lower courts' unruliness in this matter 
is that in some cases to obtain suspension 
is itself the main objective of the plaintiff 
The simplest reason is that it can reinforce 
a party's bargaining position, but it may 
also allow the plaintiff to perform certain 
actions on time before the litigated decision . 
takes effect. 
'Suspension, therefore, is an 
interesting service for many litigants in the 
administrative courts and judges fully realise 
this. Hierarchical control on the use of 
suspension cannot include all of its aspects 
36 These included fonl1al carefulness, fair play, justification, fomlallegal certainty. substantive legal certainty, 
trust, equality, substantive carefulness and proportionality. 
37 This is the more influential fonn of oversight by the Supreme Court on the lower courts. See Pompe (2005), 
pp. 255-262. 
38 See for instance Hamidi, J. (1999) Penerapan Asas-Asas UIII1I111 Penycfenggaraan Pemerintahan fang 
Layak (AAUPPL) Di Lingkrlllgan Peradilan Adminislrasi [ndol1esia, Bandung, CitraAditya Bakti. 
39 Bedner (200 I) p. 112. 
4oNo.140/GI1991JPTUN-Jkt. 
41 No. 45/G/1993/PTUN-Jkt. 
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and as a consequence the practice is neither 
consistent nor weH-argued. 
The remedies other than suspension the 
administrative courts can offer on the basis 
of the AeA are rather limited. As stated 
earlier in this article, the main difference 
with the situation as it existed before the 
administrative courts were established is that 
they can actually order the plaintiff to revoke 
his decision. An important development has 
been the interpretation by the administrative 
courts of Article 116's paragraph 9, which 
allows tlle administrative court to order the 
defendant to issue a new decision. Given the 
general tendency ofthe administrative courts 
to widen their powers, it will not come as 
a surprise that the courts have interpreted 
this provision in a very liberal manner. 
This has not gone as far as that judges 
have tllemselves issued an administrative 
decision in lieu o/the original one, but in 
some cases they have actually prescribed 
the plaintiff what should be the contents of 
tlle new administrative decision.42 This has 
certainly made them more attractive from 
the point of view of litigants. 
That does not hold for the article 
on damage compensation in the 1986 
Administrative Court Act. 43 Damage 
compensation has been provided for by 
Article 97(10), which says nothing more 
than that this matter is to be further arranged 
in a government regulation. The required 
regulation was enacted with remarkable 
speed - in 1991 - but it turned out to be 
an empty shell: damage compensation is 
limited to 5 million Rp, at that time the 
equivalent 0[2000 USD, today reduced to a 
mere 530 USD. For additional compensation 
the plaintiff has to start a separate suit at the 
civil court.44 In short, the inability of the 
administrative courts to administer damage 
compensation is a good example of the 
effective reduction of citizens' protection 
against the government by introducing 
complex procedures.45 
Thus, from a legal perspective the 
administrative courts have provided an 
extension for citizens' protection against 
the government regarding the grounds for 
compensation, but apart from this they have 
little more to offer to plaintiffs than the civil 
courts had. Moreover, they have complicated 
jurisdiction and effectively limited access. 
It therefore seems that they have reduced 
rather than improved the position of those 
seeking justice against the government. 
On the other hand, we have seen 
Some advantages as well. In addition to 
increased political independence, viSibility 
and professionalism may to some extent 
have outweighed the negative aspects 
of administrative court establishment 
and perfonnance as sketched above. The 
question is to what extent the administrative 
courts have upheld claims of litigants and 
whether these judgments have in practice 
led to the desired outcome, i.e. to what 
extent they have contributed to 'real legal 
certainty'46 for citizens defending their 
42 Some examples are no. 04/GITUN/1994/PTUN-Smg., no. 25/G/PTUN-Bdg.l1993, no. 06/GITUN/19941 
PTUN-Smg. 
43 Bedner (2001), p. 47. 
44 I have found no indications that this actually hHppens. 
45 ft is moreover exceedingly djfficult to calculate the amount of damage ineurred becausc of the 
abOVCmeJltiollCd problcm~ in detcrmining the day from which the litigaled dC'cision must be doomed to have lost 
its legal consequences. 
46 The term is Otto's, see Olto, I.M. (2002) 'Towrmls an Annlylical Framework. Real Legal Certainty and its 
Explnnatory Factors', in Chen, 1. Li. Y. and 1.M. Olto (eds) /mplclII(,lIfaliOI7 of Law ill the People's Rcpuhti(' oj 
China, The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law lnternatiol1!ll, pp. 23--34. 
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rights. I have already paid some attention 
to this matter in the context of suspension, 
but in most cases in the end the plaintiff 
looks for a final settlement of the case by a 
judgment that is actually implemented. This 
starts with an assessment of administrative 
court case outcomes or in other words: in 
how many cases have courts upheld claims 
by litigants? 
This is hard to examine, since such 
data are not commonly accessible. The 
Supreme Court website now features a 
search engine for case law, but unfortunately 
at the time of writing this paper it was not 
operative yet. I therefore have to mainly 
rely on my data of the 1990s. These indicate 
that following an administrative court 
procedure is a somewhat unpredictable 
but not completely vain effort to redress 
unfavourable government actions. 
The first question is whether plaintiffs 
stand any chance at all of winning their 
cases in first instance. Even if under the New 
Order the political odds were very much 
against them, in order to survive the courts 
had to demonstrate that they dared to defy 
officials. Rejecting all claims would have 
been a bid for doing nothing. For the period 
1991-1995 the result was that in the Jakarta, 
Bandung and Semarang administrative 
courts almost 50 percent of the cases judged 
on substance were upheld.47 
However, neither plaintiffs nor 
defendants easily accept a negative judgment 
of the first instance court. For instance, 
between 1991 and 1995 out of 405 cases 
decided by the Jakarta administrative court 
346 were submitted to the appellate court, 
which is more than 85 percent. That lodging 
an appeal makes sense is clear from the 
fact that almost 40 percent of these were 
overturned (1991-1995).48 
Cassation is not as popular as appeal, 
but still more than half of the appellate 
judgments are submitted to the Supreme 
Court.49 The relative number of judgments 
overturned stands at about IS percent. This 
was achieved by the end of the 1990s and was 
somewhat higher during the first five years 
of administrative courts practice, which 
seems to indicate that legal certainty has 
moderately increased. However, a judgment 
in cassation in Indonesia is not as final as it 
should be. Originally intended as a remedy 
for extraordinary cases, review of cassation 
judgments has matured into a sort offourth 
instance in Indonesia. Between 1991 and 
1999 more than 20 percent of cassation 
judgments in administrative litigation were 
submitted for revision and one in ten cases 
was overturned. This clearly shows the 
inconsistency in Supreme Court judging and 
provides a clear incentive to parties to go all 
the way down the litigation road. 
What does this eventually mean 
for the prospects of the plaintiff? Data 
taken from a PhD-dissertation by Irfan 
Fachruddin, concerning cases at the Bandung 
administrative court between 1994 and 
1999, indicate that the percentage of cases 
won by the plaintiff drops radically through 
the appellate and cassation procedures.5o 
Only one out of 25 plaintiffs wins his case. 
If we disregard cases that are clearly outside 
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts 
this means about 8 percent. 
47 Onc should realise that certainly during that period many elnims were introduced that made no sense at all. 
Therefore I have left out those cases dismissed on procedural grounds. 
48 12 out of 26 cases. 
49 167 appeals from 321 cases from 1991-1995. 
50 Fachruddin, l. Pcnga)l"as(l1I Pemdil(ll! Admilli.l"tmsi Terlradap Ttndakal1 Peml!rinlah, Bandung, Alu!llni, 
2004. 
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The length of the procedure is moreover 
considerable, although shorter than in civil 
procedure. On average, a case going thmugh 
the entire procedure takes between one to 
four years. 51 
The next stage concerns the 
implementation of the judgments upheld. This 
is a critical issue, viewed by administrative 
courts judges themselves as a kind of a 
nightmare - which is quite understandable 
given the damage non-execution does to 
both the perception of their status and their 
effectiveness in providing remedies. Given 
the dearth of cases administrative courts 
have to face, such a challenge to their 
authority is in fact a direct threat to their 
existence. 
When I did research in Indonesia 
in the administrative courts in the early 
19908, few judgments were in the stage 
yet that they could be implemented. Press 
reports indicated that in three cases - two 
concerning certificates of land ownership and 
one concerning the license to harvest birds' 
nests - the defendant did not implement the 
judgment. At that time already lUany judges 
complained about execution problems, but 
this actual1y concerned suspension orders, 
of which I recorded 26 cases of non~ 
obedience. 52 
Relying again on Fachruddin's data, 
execution takes place in 38 percent of the 
entered judgments won by the plaintiff. This 
means that ultimately approximately one out 
of 40 plaintiffs wins his case and sees the 
judgment implemented. 
These numbers should obviously be 
treated with caution, as infonnation about 
the precise nature of the cases and the legal 
issues involved could make them look 
more positive. However, they seem quite 
disappointing in view of the reputation of 
the Indonesian government and seem to 
reinforce the view that the administrative 
courts are not very effective. 
FOUR THESES 
The case of the administrative courts 
gives rise to the following conclusions 
about the potential of specialised courts for 
promoting judicial performance. 
First and foremost, when we look 
at effectiveness and efficiency, the main 
finding is that ultimately the administrative 
courts do not seem to have brought what 
the rule of law supporters hoped for. The 
number of claims upheld and implemented 
is discouraging, certainly in view of the 
amount of time needed to attain this result. 
I have not discussed the issue of costs, but 
should add here that there is much corruption 
in the courts and that even if a plaintiff has 
a strong legal position, to win a case often 
means to pay a substantial amount. 53 
Nonetheless, although they may not 
have produced the results wished for, in 
certain regards the courts have meant an 
important step forward compared to the 
situation in the civil courts. 
The first thesis formulated on the 
basis of this evaluation relates to political 
independence and access. It is that creating 
a specialised court with a specific, limited 
segment of jurisdiction is likely to reinforce 
the activism ofthis court. Some would argue 
that in the case of the administrative courts 
the main incentive has been the judges' 
51 The reason is that thecasc10ud at the Supreme Court is quile high. Although backlogs are not nearly as serious 
as in the case of the civil courts, since 1999 the backlog for administrative court cases stands at approximately 700 
cases waIting to be judged, with the judges just about keeping up with the number of incoming cases. 
52 Bedner (2001), pp. 230-232. 
53 For more details see Bedner (2001), pp. 234-240. 
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own pockets, but tbis is too shallow an 
explanation.54 Few judges like to sit idly. 
In the case of the administrative courts an 
important consequence of this situation 
has been that judges have had to reinforce 
their (political) independence vis-a.-vis the 
executive, which has been noticed both by 
the executive itself and by the media.55 In 
the most outstanding case dealt with by the 
administrative courts so far - concerning 
the rescission of the publication permit 
of the weekly Tempo - it was clear that 
the Supreme Court could not assert itself 
against the Soeharto government as the 
administrative courts of first instance and 
appeal had done. 
It should be noted, of course, that 
the problems with jurisdiction outlined 
above indicate that one should be very 
careful by designating a certain scope of 
jurisdiction. When it is too narrow, as has 
been the case with the administrative courts, 
this will induce the judges concerned to 
'irresponsible' activism and jurisdictional 
fights with other courts. Here we should 
note the role of the highest judge of appeal. 
If this is a general Supreme Court overseeing 
the various judicial branches, they may 
attempt to strike down such policies by the 
lower specialised courts. It will depend on 
the authority they command whether their 
policies will be obeyed or not. In the case 
of the administrative courts the results 
have been mixed, with cases concerning 
land rights and land certificates as notable 
problem areas. If the highest court is 
specialised as well, this obviously changes 
the stakes. In that case there is a serious 
chance that jurisdictions may be severely 
mixed up. 
The other side of submitting specialised 
courts to the jurisdiction of a general 
Supreme Court is that at the level of this 
Supreme Court the incentive for activism 
is absent. Under the authoritarian New 
Order regime this was quite evident in 
some political cases (Tempo being the best-
known example). The effect of establishing 
specialised courts under a general Supreme 
Court therefore largely depends oh the 
quality of that Supreme Court. This also 
applies to such issues as length of the 
procedure, which is largely determined 
by the Supreme Court system for its case 
management. S6 
The second thesis is that specialised 
courts by their nature do not offer any 
special advantage over general courts 
as regards social independence. The 
administrative courts were set up as an 
'elite' project, which should only attract the 
most independent-minded judges from the 
general courts, as demonstrated by their 
record of administering justice. They were 
given special educational facilities, and 
good prospects for promotion. While that 
was basically a good idea, it did not work 
because the status of an elite cannot be based 
on 'esprit de corps' only. Moreover, the 
special educational facilities were gradually 
closed down and in the course of a few 
years all attractive positions had been filled. 
54 This finding is supported by the fact that in several cases where judges did extend their jurisdiction the 
plaintiff ultim:ltely lost his case. These include cases where! am positive after in depth interviewing of those 
involved and on the b:lsis of the reputation of the judges concerned that no bribes were paid. 
55 Bedner (200 I), p. 261. 
5(, For instance, if the Supreme Court ha~ a separate section ofjndges dealing with a certain type of cases it may 
wcll be lhntb[lcklogs only develop within certain sections, The Indonesian Supreme Court has a somewhat mixed 
system, wilh a number of judges appointed for administrativc cases, but also ndjudica!ing civil or criminal matters. 
Ifsuch a system had not been in rlilce, the b[lcklog in ndministrati\'e court cases would have been far larger. 
In the absence of better salaries or other 
amenities the decision to set up too many 
courts where no cases were to be expected, 
the administrative courts were simply not 
competitive enough to attract judges willing 
to resist the temptations of accepting illicit 
payments. 57 The worst is perhaps that the 
Supreme Court - initially together with 
the Ministry of Justice - has corrupted the 
system of promotions itself, which has 
brought judges of dubious reputations to 
positions of authority. 58 As remarked earlier, 
resistance from the judiciary as a 'corps' 
prevented the appointment of judges in ad 
hoc to remedy this situation. 
The third thesis is the obvious one 
that specialised Courts tend to promote 
the professionalism of judges. As they 
only have to focus on a more limited field 
they will sooner acquire expertise in it. 
My findings on the administrative courts 
described elsewhere indicate that the 
strength of this effect is reduced by the 
influence of bribes and a lack of accessibility 
of legal infonnation. To some extent this 
combination of factors has led to a vicious 
circle, with judges preferring to remain 
'unknowledgeable' because this reinforces 
their discretion in cases submitted to them. 
Ifwe look at the administrative courts, yet, 
some progress can be distinguished none 
the less. Exchange of legal infonnation is 
more common than in the general courts. 
The limits in size and numbers of judges 
involved support more commonly held 
interpretations. It should also be noted that 
the lower number of court cases enables 
the Supreme Court to better perform its 
function of guaranteeing legal unity, even 
if the Supreme Court itself is susceptible to 
social and political pressure in part of the 
cases involved. 
Finally, the fourth thesis claims that 
because special courts generally deal with 
fewer cases, they hold a more serious stake in 
ensuring that they are accessible and that they 
will do whatever they can to ensure that their 
judgments are implemented. Unfortunately, 
in the case of the administrative courts the 
issue of implementation has been largely 
beyond their powers. Regarding access there 
is also a negative side, as in fact establishing 
special courts for cases that were first part 
of the jurisdiction of the civil (or general) 
courts likely will reduce access. In the 
present case that was clearly something not 
carefully considered by the proponents of 
the new courts. 
The Tax Court 
The Indonesian taxcourtwas established 
in 1994, under pressure from the Ministry 
of Finance to speed up procedures and to 
reduce the number of judiCial instances they 
had to deal with. As the Director General 
of Taxes is part of this Ministry and the 
defendant in most tax disputes, it is easy to 
see why this organisation put so much effort 
in this matter. Since the enactment of the 
Administrative Court Act the Ministry had 
to deal with a special administrative body 
of appeal, the administrative high court, and 
the Supreme Court - instead of the first one 
mentioned only. Until 1991 this specialised 
Tax Council (Majelis Pertimbangan Fajak) 
adjudicated tax disputes in administrative 
appeal in a single instance. After the 
administrative courts were established, 
57 It should be noted that the government may also be wi!lillg to pay for a favoumblc decision, Nonetheless, 
I would consider this as evidence of the political independence of courts rather than the opposite. 
58 Given the influence of cOUli chairmen in pilrticular in what happens within their courts, this has serious 
consequences for the infonnal rules of c.onduct. 
the central and regional branch offices of 
the Tax Agency - the fonner falling under 
the Ministry of Finance - suddenly saw 
themselves confronted with appeal to the 
Administrative High Court in Jakarta in 
many cases and subsequently cassation to 
the Supreme Court in quite a few of those. 
Therefore, the creation of the tax courts 
basically meant a return to the old system. 
This situation lasted until 2002 when 
Act no. 14 of 2002 semi-integrated the 
tax court into the judicial structure. The 
compromise nature of the law is clearly 
visible in the provisions dealing with the 
role of the Supreme Court: an appeal for 
cassation against a judgment by the Tax 
Court is not allowed, but if the judgment 
'clearly does not conform to prevailing tax 
regulations' it can be submitted for special 
review (Art. 77(3)).59 Apparently this is 
a form of 'marginal appreciation' hitherto 
unknown in Indonesian court procedure, 
although it comes close to the procedure 
followed before the administrative high 
court in cases decided on administrative 
appea1.60 
The case of the tax court thus clearly 
differs from the administrative courts, as it 
had not branched offfrom the general courts. 
The Tax Council had always been a special 
semi-court and consequently it had become 
used to fight for its turf. Moreover, there 
is only one tax court for all of Indonesia, 
which deals with approximately 2000 cases 
a year: a sufficient number to keep the tax 
judges at work and hence little need for 
increased judicial activism. 61 If we look at 
accessibility from this perspective, the fact 
that there is only one tax court in Jakarta 
certainly is a problem, but as this had always 
been the case already it cannot be labelled 
as a step back.62 
Ultimately, the Ministry of Finance's 
coup has not been much of a success in 
terms of regaining control of the judges 
dealing with tax cases. Under the old regime 
the Ministry had enjoyed full powers of 
management, while now this authority lies 
with the Supreme Court. The removal of 
the administrative high court from the line 
up for adjudication has meant but a meagre 
compensation for this, in particular because 
in practice a full appeal for cassation is 
effectively possible. 
With these differences in mind we can 
make the following observations on the 
theses advanced earlier. First, the political 
independence of the tax courts has been 
reinforced, though not so much for the 
turf battles they have had to wage, but 
because they have been integrated into the 
judiciary and under the Supreme Court. In 
a way the case of the tax courts is much 
more conventional than the administrative 
court case: a specialised body for appeal 
has been integrated into the judiciary, 
while maintaining its specialised character. 
Consequently, jurisdiction has not become 
a problem. 
Critical support for this thesis comes 
from the number of cases won by plaintiffs. 
According to the US Embassy, 75% of 
59 This extraordinary procedure is normally reserved for cases which have already been decided on 
cassation. 
60 In 004/PUU~Ifl2004 the Constitutional Court has upheld the Tax Court Law with the argument that this 
me~ltls that this reason is 'substantially the same as the reason for filing for cassation'. 
6l Research note on the fndonesinn Tax COllrt by Fatahillah, dated 27 Allgllst 2006. 
62 Article 3 of the Tax Court Act establishes the court in .Iaknrta, but leaves open the possibility for addition::tl 
courts. Article 4 allows for sessions of the court in other places than Jakarta. [ have not found any information 
that this opporlunity has been used. If so, in any case not on a re.e:ular basis 
all plaintiffs won their case in the court 
in 2003, the first year of ifs existence as 
an independent judicial instance. 63 The 
newspapers Kompas and Pikiran Rakyat, 
citing the secretariat of the Tax Court, give 
somewhat less exuberant and likely more 
reliable figures, going up from 22 percent 
of cases won in 2000, via 40 in 2001, 42 
in 2002, to 47 in 2003 and 2004." Still, 
this makes the tax court rather attractive, as 
implementation of the judgment is far easier 
than with the administrative courts. Since 
taxpayers only have to pay 50 percent of the 
disputed tax they at least gain half of what 
they would have been liable to pay if the 
defendant refuses to return this amount. 
As regards the expertise of the tax 
courts not much has changed, since the 
practice has been maintained that former 
officials of the Ministry of Finance fonn 
part of the staff of the tax courts. Although 
incomplete, the data on the new Supreme 
Court directory65 provide some useful 
information on the tax court practice. It 
contains 39 tax court cases, 31 of them from 
2004, meaning approximately one fourth of 
the total number of cases of that year. This 
overall number shows in the first place that 
the relative number of appeals is far lower 
than in the case of the administrative courts, 
only about five percent. Assuming that the 
cases in the directory are representative, 
we can also conclude that there is much 
consistency in the outcome: the large 
majority of appeals were from plaintiffs (27 
out of 31) and unsuccessful. Only a single 
appeal was upheld and that concerned one 
of the four appeals made by the Director 
Genera! of Taxes. This seems to confinn 
that in terms of expertise the situation 
is certainly more favourable than when 
the administrative high court still held 
jurisdiction, which is obvious, as these 
judges were - certainly initially - not well 
versed in this field oflaw. 
There are hardly any data available to 
judge the 'social independence thesis!. It is 
certain that the imposition of cassation has 
reduced the potential for judicial discretion 
and thereby judicial leeway for corruption. 
We should also note that the judges staffing 
the tax courts are drawn from the general 
courts and may pursue their careers as judges 
at the higher levels of the general courts, a 
situation that in fact already existed when 
the tax court was still the Tax Council. 
Summarising, we can say that the tax 
courts confirm the main theses formulated 
at the end of the first section. While their 
political independence has been reinforced 
and their expertise been maintained, their 
social independence is unclear. The presence 
of former officials of the Ministry of 
Finance does not provide the kind of outside 
influence needed to counter this situation, 
nor is their remuneration sufficient. We will 
now consider these issues from the results 
of one of the most controversial attempts at 
court specialisation. 
The commercial courts 
The commercial courts were established 
in the aftennath of the financial crisis hitting 
Indonesia in 1997. Their objective was to 
create a reliable mechanism for dealing with 
bankruptcy cases and to restore the trust of 
foreign investors in Indonesia. It is therefore 
not surprising that no other special courts 
63 Cited in Van def Eng. P. (2004) 'Business in fndonesia: Old Problems and New ChnlJenges', in Chatib Basrih, 
M. and P. Van der Eng, Bllsiness in Indonesia, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 16. 
64 Kompas 31-5-2004, Pikirall Rakya/ l-IQ-2007. 
~5 h ttn :1/WWW.Dutusan.net/ann-l11nri/mrt!Jsn n/inrl,." n hn'l,.."v; r'l=r 
established so far have received so much 
donor support, in this case from the IMF 
and the Dutch government. 66 
This is not to say that there was no 
support within Indonesia for setting up the 
commercial courts. Just as in the case of the 
administrative courts, pro-rule oflaw groups 
saw the commercial courts as an opportunity 
to shake up the corrupt and incompetent civil 
courts and to create a judicial elite that could 
serve as an example for refonn.67 
While support forthe corrunercial courts 
was thus considerable, they had to face even 
more formidable resistance. Indonesia's 
technically bankrupt conglomerates had 
a great interest in preventing formal 
bankruptcy. For good reasons, they were 
hoping that by warding off such threats they 
would in the end be helped by the Indonesian 
government to restructure their debts and 
continue or resume business. Given the 
economic interests of much of Indonesia's 
political elite, one can say that threats to 
judicial independence were not only social 
but also political in nature. 
The commercial courts were created as 
part of a reform of bankruptcy law. Dutch 
technical assistance was provided to both 
create a new bankruptcy law and train the 
judges for the new courts. The project team 
not only included Dutch bankruptcy law 
experts, but also scholars and advocates who 
were highly knowledgeable about Indonesian 
law in general and the Indonesian judiciary 
in particular. They could assist to bridge 
the gap between the Dutch and Indonesian 
sides in order to adjust this legal transplant 
to Indonesian conditions. 68 
The result of the project differed 
somewhat from that of both the 
administrative and the tax court. Unlike 
these, the commercial courts have not 
become physically unlinked from the 
general courts. In fact they constitute a 
division of the latter, where only judges 
with special training can be admitted. 
However, these judges no longer serve on 
the general courts and therefore they are 
dependent on their own jurisdiction for 
their workload.69 In one regard they are 
like the tax court: there is only appeal for 
cassation to the Supreme Court. This has an 
important consequence for judicial careers, 
as the judges in the commercial courts 
cannot be promoted to a court of appeal, 
which allegedly makes it less attractive to 
start a career in this division.7° As regards 
their number, the commercial courts are 
somewhere in between the single tax court 
and the 27 administrative courts: there are 
five of then, in Makassar, Surabaya, Medan, 
Semarang and Central Jakarta. 
Before we continue to look at the 
commercial court record, we ne~d to 
touch on two issues. First, the 'reformers' 
were fully aware of the need to make 
sure that in order to guarantee their social 
independence the judges of the commercial 
courts should be better paid than their 
colleagues. However, in the end substantive 
measures to realise this [oundered on the 
resistance of the Supreme Court leadership, 
M IMFlNetherlands Program Legal and Judicial Refonn in Indonesia 2000-2004: External Evaluation Final 
Report, January 16, 2005, p. xii. 
67 Cr. Sadiilwilti, D. (n.d.) 'Ek~istellsi Pengadilan Niaga Dun Perkembilngilnnya Dalam Era GloboJisasi', 
Unpublished Paper, BnppenilS. 
68 Extcmn Evnluation Final Report (2005). 
69 Although npparently more recently commercial court judges have been called in all civil and criminal cases 
again (External Evaluation Report (2005»). 
70 Sndiawnti, (n.d.) p. 15. 
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for reasons similar to those in the case of 
the administrative courts. Tough negotiation 
initially led to higher salaries being paid, but 
later on the differences were reduced and in 
fact vanished altogether.7! 
The second issue concerned the 
involvement of 'judges in ad hoc'. This was 
a matter of great concern to the Indonesian 
and Dutch experts on the judicial system, 
who were convinced of the potential of this 
measure, not only from a social independence 
perspective, but also in order to increase the 
courts' expertise. As a result of their efforts, 
the Supreme Court leadership - at that 
time still under the conservative Soeharto 
appointee Sarwata - could not prevent the 
inclusion of a provision on judges in ad 
hoc into the law, 'but later on it has used 
all defences available against its effective 
realisation. This started with delaying the 
adoption of an implementing regulation 
on judges in ad hoc and continued with 
efforts to prevent judges in ad hoc from 
being effectively appointed. As a result, 
the majority of cases has been decided by 
councils of career judges only and in no case 
have judges in ad hoc formed the majority 
on a council. 
In spite of a wide range of literature 
dealing with the performance of the 
commercial courts it is not easy to determine 
to what extent they have realised the 
objectives set out at the start. Opinions vary 
from those who claim that the courts have 
done rather well,72 to some who claim that 
they have been an almost complete failure. 73 
lfwe look at these analyses, the conclusion 
is that they do not so much disagree about 
facts, but that they differ mainly in their 
definition of success, as in fact noted in both 
the official Evaluation Report and the article 
by Schroeder-Van Waes and Sidharta. 
These have noted that the commercial 
courts have done rather well, with some 
abominable exceptions. The so-called 
'Team of Seven', appointed by the Steering 
Committee of the project to review 'the 
soundness of 300 Commercial Court 
decisions', found that more than two thirds 
of these decisions were defensible under 
the law,74 while Schroeder-Van Waes 
and Sidharta speak of a 'large majority of 
well motivated rulings on complex legal 
issues'. According to the Evaluation Report 
there were in fact more problems with 
cassation than with the procedure before the 
commercial courts of first instance. 75 
The fact is, however, that the 
abominable exceptions have tended to 
eclipse the regular cases. Most notorious is 
the Manulife case, where the court decided 
to declare bankrupt the Indonesian daughter 
of Canadian assurance giant, on the basis 
of a highly unlikely claim from one of its 
fonner business partners supported by flimsy 
evidence. The case elicited a sharp reaction 
from the Canadian government and the 
world press, and in a clear demonstration of 
lack of political independence the Supreme 
Court leadership suspended the three judges 
71 Personal communication by one of the project managers (October 2007), cf. External Evaluation Report 
(2005), p. 13. 
7~ E.g, S.chroeder-Van Waes, M.C. and K. Sidharta (2004) 'Upholding Indonesian Bankruptcy Legislntion', in 
Challb BasTlh, M. and.P. Van der Eng, Business in IlIdonesia, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
73 E.g. Lindsey, T (2000) 'Black Letter Law, Black Market and Bad Faith: Corruption and the Failure of Law 
Reform'. in: Manning, C. and P. Van Dienucn (2000) flldollcsia ill Transition: Social Aspects ofRejorlllGsi and 
Crisis, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 278--292. 
74 Extemul Evahmtion report, p. 15. 
75 External EVilluiltiolJ Report, p. iv. 
Rebuilding the JudicimT in Indonesia (Adriaan Bedllel) 247 
involved in the caseJ6 Other cases showed 
clear signs of corruption. According to one 
expert involved in the project, judges who 
in most cases applied the rules in a clear 
and unequivocal manner in a few others 
used quite different interpretations of these 
same rules. 77 The fact that all cases dealt 
with by the commercial courts are published 
and made available to both the judges 
themselves and whoever is interested in 
them has clearly reinforced the uniformity 
of legal interpretation - to the extent that 
it is easy to see whether a judgment really 
makes no sense at al. 78 l 
The critics of the commercial courts 
obviously point at the 'bad' cases, but their 
argument goes further. They claim that 
the commercial courts have been a failure 
because they have not achieved what they 
had been established for: a swift and reliable 
procedure to clear the debts. of defaulting 
firms in order to allow for the restructuring 
of the Indonesian ec;:onomy and to restore 
confidence of foreign investors. This has not 
happened. In the words of David Linnan, 
'creditors voted with their feet' and stopped 
using the commercial courts. 
It is questionable, however, if the 
commercial court can be blamed for this. 
The Evaluation Report, for instance, noted 
that most of the problems occurred only 
after banlauptcy had been declared. In the 
model adopted a crucial role is played by the 
'receivers', who actually settle the debts. In 
practice these receivers have not functioned 
well and it turned out that a bankruptcy 
declaration was merely a prelude to a long 
and windy trajectory with little effective 
gains for the creditor who had applied for 
the bankruptcy. 
There have been some problems 
concerning the jurisdiction of the commercial 
courts as well. In fact one encounters the 
reverse of the administrative court practice: 
in this case the civil courts have intruded 
upon the jurisdiction of their colleagues in 
the commercial court division. It concerns 
cases where the commercial courts imposed 
seizure on goods of the debtor, where the 
civil courts had already ordered seizure on 
the basis of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Whereas the latter is no longer valid after 
the general seizure on the basis of the 
bankruptcy has been imposed, civil courts 
have continued to treat them as if they 
were still valid, or even imposed seizure 
after the commercial court had declared 
bankruptcy.79 
Another issue which reminds us of 
the administrative courts is the fact that the 
commercial courts have effectively managed 
to deal with cases rather swiftly, keeping 
within the strict time limits imposed by the 
law, but that the Supreme Court has not 
observed these in several cases and hence 
cases slow at least a bit down (though not 
as badly as ordinary civil cases).80 
In any case, whether the cause is the 
damage done to public trust by the widely 
publicised incomprehensible judgments or 
the availability of swifter and more adequate 
alternatives, the number of bankruptcy cases 
76 This procedure has been riddled with inconsistencies. It is unclear on what basis these judges were suspended 
and they have since been waiting to appear before an official honorary council. 
77 Personal communication, July 2007. See also Schroeder~ Van Waes and Sidharta (2004). .. 
78 There have been some differences in interpretation in ordinary cases, none the less, see e.g. Sadwwatl 
(n.d.). However, most of them have been relatively inconsequentin! and ahannonising tendency has been clearly 
discernible. 
79 Sadiawati (n.d.), p. 6. 
80 Sadiawati (n.d.) p. 4. 
lodged at the commercial courts has seriously 
declined. While in 1999 100 petitions were 
filed at the Jakarta Commercial Court, the 
number had dropped to 38 in 2003. 
This does not mean, however, that 
the commercial courts have manoeuvred 
themselves out of business. In 200 I their 
mandate was extended to also include 
disputes concerning intellectual property, 
and here we see the reverse trend: from 63 
claims in 2002 to 84 in 2004. Generally 
speaking, the way in which the courts deal 
with these cases is described as satisfactory, 
even if it only concerns rather simple trade 
mark cases. 8! This means effectively that 
. the courts have not run out of business 
altogether, or at least not in Jakarta. 
Comparing these findings with the 
theses advanced earlier, we find that they are 
more or less supported. The most interesting 
issue concerns the political independence 
of the commercial courts. Although not a 
specific court for deciding cases against 
the government, as the administrative court 
and the tax court, the political nature of 
bankruptcy cases has been clear from the 
start. The need for Indonesia to restore trust 
of foreign investors, in combination with the 
amount of media attention they received, has 
put much pressure on the judges to apply 
the law in favour of plaintiffs. However, the 
interests of those representing the Indonesian 
'shadow-state'. - referring to those intimately 
linked to state officials but only pursuing 
their private objectives - have gone flatly 
against this. It seems that the latter have 
outweighed the fornler; if not represented 
in numbers of cases then at least in the trust 
in the courts and their attractiveness for 
potential plaintiffs. 
This does not much undermine the 
political independence thesis, not only 
because so many cases have been decided 
correctly - and against vested interests - but 
also because the courts had the alternative 
of intellectual property rights. As a result 
they could in any case continue to hear 
cases, at least the court in Jakarta. Unlike 
the administrative courts, the commercial 
courts have had no opportunity to extend 
their jurisdiction against the civil courts and 
therefore jurisdictional fights have been the 
consequence of civil court behaviour rather 
than the other way round. In fact, making 
themselves more accessible has been 
mainly outside the power ofthe commercial 
court. 
No matter h.ow negative some 
perceptions of the commercial courts are, 
no one seems to deny that the expertise of the 
commercial courts has increased. It should 
be said that in .the case of the commercial 
courts every effort has been made to achieve 
this and that perhaps in this light the results 
have been unimpressive. This view is 
supported by David Linnan's observation 
that in the field of intellectual property rights 
the courts mainly deal with the relatively 
simple trademark cases. 82 But still, when 
compared to the civil courts the commercial 
court record seems much better - even if 
only because the matter can be scrutinised 
from the judgments published. 
As to the 'social independence thesis', 
tlle transparency of the courts has certainly 
made judges more cautious in ·this respect 
- with the exception of course ofthe glaring 
misjUdgements made. Given that these 
have been overturned at the cassation level 
indicates that results of corruption can be 
gl Linnan, D.K. 'The !ndonesian Commercia! Court, or How to Accounl for Vastly Differing Court Perfom1ance 
by Substantive Area?', paper presented at the 'New Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region Conference, University of 
Victoria, 15 July 2007. 
Kl T.inmlll (1007) 
restored at this level. This obviously also 
applies to civil cases, but then these are 
seldom published and by their special nature 
the commercial courts have received more 
attention from the media. It thus seems that 
social independence has been somewhat 
increased, but not seriously. 
Conclusion 
The strategy to establish special courts 
in order to improve judicial performance 
has been central to Indonesian policies 
pertaining to the administration of justice. 
In combination with attempts to reinforce 
dispute settlement outside the court system 
- for instance by regulating and promoting 
mediation, and by establishing a Human 
Right's Commission and ah Ombudsman 
- this should ultimately lead to a complete 
restructuring of the judiciary. 
It is clear that this strategy has not been 
entirely successful so far, something already 
evident from the experience with its first 
result, the administrative courts. These have 
themselves become part of the problem, 
having been labelled as 'dysfunctional' in 
various cases, and provided the reason to 
establish new specialised courts, such as the 
tax court and the industrial relations courts. 
This gives fuel to the idea that establishing 
special courts is just a way of transferring 
problems from one institution to the other. 
Nonetheless, depending on the 
conditions under which these courts evolve 
and the form they have been given, some 
of the alleged advantages may actually 
contribute to an improved performance. 
First, political independence of the 
courts tends to be reinforced. This is 
most clear if courts for their case load 
depend on cases against the government, 
or if the government holds a clear stake 
in them. In this case specialised courts 
have an institutional interest in political 
independence: if they do not decide any 
cases against the government they will lose 
their legitimacy and run out of business. 
This has been most clear in the cases of the 
administrative courts and the tax court, and 
is confinned by findings on the performance 
of the constitutional court. One might be 
tempted to add the human rights courts 
here, but then the evidence is limited to the 
human rights court in ad-hoc concerning 
East Timor, where this did not play much of 
a role because of the extraordinary nature of 
this institution. 
Second, the relatively small scale of 
most special courts makes judges more 
aware of the decisions of their colleagues, 
even in the absence of an ordered publication 
system for judgments, while the relatively 
limited jurisdiction of special courts also 
makes it easier to obtain legal e:xpertise. 
Indeed, expertise seems to have increased 
in all three cases discussed. In fact it is 
difficult to conceive of a situation where 
specialisation would not reinforce expertise. 
This is also determined by accounts of the 
human rights courts, the industrial relations 
courts, and most of all the constitutional 
court. 
The main downsides of the 
specialised court strategy, as it has been 
implemented in Indonesia, concern 
entangled jurisdictions and problems with 
imp lementation. Harmonising jurisdictions 
may be very difficult, as demonstrated by 
the administrative court experience over 
the past 17 years. Specialised courts tend 
to fragment jurisdiction across various 
judicial institutions in systems where often 
judicial power is already fragmented. 
This is not only a matter of law, but also 
one of judicial interests, which tend to go 
unchecked through the absence of effective 
hierarchical controls. For someone seeking 
justice, it will mean that he has to address 
one court for every aspect of his case and as 
a consequence the good performance of one 
court can be outdone by another. 
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A more neutral finding is that 
specialised courts by their nature do not 
offer any particular advantage regarding 
social independence. Both in the case of the 
administrative courts and the commercial 
courts corruption has remained entrenched. 
I think this points needs to be Buanced, 
however. First, special courts are usually 
more 'visible' than general courts. They draw 
public attention and scrutiny, which goes 
against social dependence. A good example 
is the commercial courts, which have been 
perceived very negatively in spite of their 
relatively reasonable performance. The 
Constitutional Court and the anti-corruption 
court also come to mind' as examples 
where this visibility may have had positive 
effects. 
Accessibility concerns a more 
problematic issue. In principle, special 
courts are more difficult to access than 
general courts because usually there are 
fewer of them. Certainly in developing 
countries such as Indonesia, funding for 
a large number of new courts will not be 
available. In the case of the administrative 
courts, which were assigned a jurisdiction 
formerly belonging to the civil courts, this 
has been quite obvious. The commercial 
courts caused a similar problem, although 
bankruptcy as an institution had fallen 
almost entirely into disuse anywhere, and 
therefore the need for it was not as clear. 
It therefore depends much on the legal and 
practical situation prior to the establishment 
of special courts to what extent accessibility 
is reduced. 
As I have sketched above, there is also 
another side to accessibility: given the wish 
for cases, special courts may tend to reduce 
the barriers to access them. This may callse 
jurisdictional problems, but it may also be 
beneficial, in the sense that plaintiffs are 
treated with more regard than in the civil 
courts. 
This leads to the conclusion that on its 
own establishing specialised courts will have 
limited effect only. It therefore makes sense 
to reinforce certain of its positive features by 
combining this strategy with others, which 
will be easier to introduce in new courts than 
in already established organisations, because 
vested interests will be less entrenched. This 
has indeed been attempted in Indonesia. 
Thus, expertise and independence have been 
reinforced by the publication of judgments. 
The best example is the commercial courts, 
with the administrative courts as an initially 
hopeful case which has later dropped behind 
again. The tax courts have very recently 
become part of this innovation, while the 
Constitutional Court is the most outspoken 
example of the success of this measure. 
Secondly, political and social 
independence Can be reinforced by 
introducing judges in ad hoc. The cases of 
the administrative courts and the commercial 
courts have demonstrated how much 
opposition there is among career judges 
against this phenomenon, but those of the 
human rights court and the constitutional 
court provide clear cases of the difference 
judges in ad hoc can make. An alternative 
for this is the use of lay judges in the 
industrial relations courts, where councils 
of judges consist of a professional judge as 
the president of the council of judges, and 
two representatives of viz. the trade union 
and the employer's association. 
One can obviously think of many 
other measures as well, such as needs 
assessments, examination of judges, 
dissenting opinions, etc. In all these cases it 
seems that experimenting with special courts 
before introducing such reform into the 
general court system makes sense. HoweveI; 
the case ofIndonesia demonstrates that too 
high expectations will be thwarted. The 
institutional environment within which 
special courts function seriOllsly affects 
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what they can do. We have seen this cle'arly 
in the case of the administrative courts 
with their problems in having judgments 
implemented and the commercial courts 
with the receivers in bankruptcy cases, while 
the problems have been even more glaring 
in the case of the East Timor trials in the 
ad-hoc human rights court and the related 
performance of the Public Prosecutor's 
Office. The position and performance of 
the Supreme Court itself also need careful 
consideration, as this institution may undo 
everything achieved in the special courts 
residing under them. 
Therefore, special courts are certainly 
not the Holy Grail in judicial refonn, but they 
do have certain intrinsic features which may 
make them the best possible way forward 
towards an efficient and effective judiciary. 
It would be helpful if the experiences in 
Indonesia would be taken into account when 
this strategy is applied elsewhere. 
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